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BETTING ON STATE EQUALITY: HOW THE 
EXPANDED EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY 
DOCTRINE APPLIES TO THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE AND SIGNALS THE DEMISE OF 
THE PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR 
SPORTS PROTECTION ACT 
Abstract: In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court revived the long-dormant 
equal sovereignty doctrine, which states that the federal government cannot enact 
legislation that renders states unequal in power, dignity, and authority. Although 
the doctrine historically applied only in the context of states entering the Union, 
in the 2013 case Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court broadened the doc-
trine’s scope, holding that the doctrine applied to all disparate treatment of states. 
As such, the revived equal sovereignty doctrine leaves federal statutes—such as 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), which prohibits 
state-sanctioned casino sports gambling in all states except for Nevada—on un-
certain constitutional grounds. Contrary to a recent Third Circuit holding, this 
Note argues that PASPA’s disparate treatment of states violates the equal sover-
eignty doctrine. Under an approach developed by this Note, which requires Con-
gress to demonstrate that disparate treatment of states is sufficiently related to the 
problem that the statute seeks to address, this Note contends that PASPA violates 
the equal sovereignty doctrine because the exemption of Nevada is not reasona-
bly related to the national problem of sports gambling, which PASPA seeks to 
address. Importantly, adopting this approach would harmonize the Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence with its recently expanded equal sover-
eignty doctrine analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 2014, 111.5 million Americans watched the Seattle Sea-
hawks overcome the Denver Broncos in Super Bowl XLVIII.1 Although the 
game took place in East Rutherford, New Jersey, an estimated 300,000 Ameri-
cans instead traveled to Nevada for Super Bowl weekend to wager a record $119 
million, yielding a $19.7 million recorded profit for Las Vegas sports books.2 In 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Richard Sandomir, Super Bowl Again Proves Bigger than the Game Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2014, at B13. 
 2 Fans Bet Record $119M on Super Bowl, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2013/story/_/id/
10399019/super-bowl-xlviii-fans-bet-record-119m-game-nevada-casinos, archived at http://perma.
cc/B5DK-9VJF (last updated Feb. 4, 2014, 9:37 AM). The $19.7 million in recorded profit broke the 
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addition, these visitors were projected to spend an estimated $106.2 million in 
nongaming activities and accommodations.3 In contrast, New Jersey’s casinos 
did not benefit from these record numbers because the 1992 Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) prohibits casino-operated sports 
books outside of Nevada.4 
Although many states already prohibited sports gambling at the time, Con-
gress passed PASPA because it perceived sports gambling as a national problem 
that could only be remedied through federal action.5 Congress concluded that 
state regulation was insufficient because the moral harm produced by sports 
gambling could not be limited geographically.6 PASPA, however, contains a 
grandfather clause that carves out an exception for states that allowed or operat-
ed a sports betting scheme between 1976 and 1990.7 In effect, this grandfather 
clause grants Nevada a virtual monopoly over casino sports gambling.8 
                                                                                                                           
existing record. Id. Note that a sports book is a betting operation that handicaps the betting odds for 
sporting events in order to encourage wagers. See Christopher T. Pickens, Of Bookies and Brokers: 
Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 
259 & n.282 (2006). See generally id. (suggesting that sports books are distinguished from traditional 
casino games because the handicap is reliant on the skill of the operator at predicting outcomes). 
 3 Gillian Spear, Think Sports Gambling Isn’t Big Money? Wanna Bet?, NBC NEWS (July 15, 2013, 
4:16 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/15/19439242-think-sports-gambling-isnt-big-
money-wanna-bet?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/7S6W-YXZG; Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING 
ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-wagering, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/B3V7-QRTP (last visited May 15, 2014). 
 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1)–(2) (2012) (prohibiting a governmental entity to sponsor or license a 
lottery, sweepstakes, or other wagering scheme based “on one or more competitive games in which 
amateur or professional athletes participate”). Compare id. § 3704 (2012) (stating that § 3702 shall not 
apply to a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a state 
at any time between 1976 and 1990), with Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House 
(and Senate): The Case for Legal State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. 
L.J. 163, 167 (2011) (explaining that PASPA exempted Nevada’s casino-operated sports books from 
regulation). 
 5 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991) (“Without Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to 
spread on a piecemeal basis and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.”). 
 6 See id.; cf. Steven L. Shur, Student Submission, Police Blockade: How the Revitalization of the 
Tenth Amendment Could Pave the Way to Legalized Sports Betting in New Jersey, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 99, 100–01 (2013) (discussing Congress’s assertion that the moral wrong produced by 
sports gambling justified federal legislation). 
 7 28 U.S.C. § 3704. PASPA gave New Jersey a one-year window to allow sports betting, but the 
state failed to pass the necessary enabling law. See § 3074(a)(3)(A) (stipulating that PASPA will not 
apply to New Jersey if a scheme was authorized no later than one year after the effective date of PAS-
PA); Thomas L. Skinner III, The Pendulum Swings: Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment Chal-
lenges to PASPA, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 311, 311–12 (2011) (explaining that New Jersey missed their 
one-year window for legalizing sports gambling). 
 8 Galasso, supra note 4, at 167 (explaining that PASPA’s overall effect granted Nevada a monop-
oly on sports gambling). PASPA also grandfathered Oregon and Delaware’s sports lotteries and Mon-
tana’s sports gambling pool. See David D. Waddell & Douglas L. Minke, Why Doesn’t Every Casino 
Have a Sports Book?, GLOBAL GAMING BUS., July 2008, at 34, 35–36. Although PASPA technically 
granted Nevada a monopoly on casino sports gambling, this priority has resulted in an effective mo-
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Although PASPA has prevented the spread of state-sanctioned sports gam-
bling, the Act has failed to stop its overall growth.9 For example, one 1999 study 
estimated that gamblers illegally wager approximately $380 billion annually on 
sports, making sports betting the most widespread and popular form of gambling 
in the United States.10 In addition, newspapers and websites across the country 
publish point spreads.11 Furthermore, sports gambling websites allow Americans 
nationwide the opportunity to gamble on sports.12 Finally, participation in fanta-
sy football leagues and college basketball brackets is common,13 with partici-
                                                                                                                           
nopoly on sports betting in general, as the size of Nevada’s sports gambling industry far exceeds the 
sports lotteries of Oregon and Delaware and the sports gambling pool of Montana. Galasso, supra 
note 4, at 166–68. Interestingly, Congress did not mention that the exception applied to Montana 
when it debated and enacted PASPA. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10, 13 (detailing that PASPA 
grandfathers sports gambling laws in only three states: Oregon, Delaware, and Nevada). 
 9 See Dylan Oliver Malagrino, Off the Board: NCAA v. Christie Challenges Congress to “Move 
the Line” on the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 375, 397 
(2013) (noting that sports gambling has significantly increased since the enactment of PASPA); Eric 
Meer, The Professional and Amateur Sports Betting Act (PASPA): A Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV 
GAMING L.J. 281, 294 (2011) (arguing that PASPA has failed to curb the rise in the popularity of 
sports betting); cf. Joe Drape, Web Site Puts Focus on the Fix in Sports Bets, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2008, at A1 (estimating Internet gaming to surpass twenty billion dollars in 2008). 
 10 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 2-14 (1999). 
 11 Id. at 3-10. A point spread is the amount of points that one team is favored over another. An-
thony Cabot, The Absence of a Comprehensive Federal Policy Toward Internet and Sports Wagering 
and a Proposal for Change, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 277 n.26 (2010). Publishing point 
spreads contributes to the popularity of sports wagering because it sends a mixed message about the 
illegality of sports gambling. Ronald J. Rychlak, A Bad Bet: Federal Criminalization of Nevada’s 
Collegiate Sports Books, 4 NEV. L.J. 320, 326 (2004). 
 12 See, e.g., SPORTSBOOK.COM, http://www.sportsbook.ag/welcome, archived at http://perma.cc/
PR9V-CPTH?type=source (last visited May 19, 2014) (providing an example of a sports gambling 
website); BOVADA, http://sports.bovada.lv, archived at http://perma.cc/PC55-MN4M (last visited 
May 19, 2014) (same); TOPBET, http://topbet.eu/sportsbook, archived at http://perma.cc/N5H9-9JY3 
(last visited May 19, 2014) (same). Although there is uncertainty as to the legality of these websites, 
recent actions by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicate that states may authorize them as they 
wish. See Whether Proposals by Ill. & N.Y. to Use the Internet and out-of-State Transaction Proces-
sors to Sell Lottery Tickets to in-State Adults Violate the Wire Act, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–2 (2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/WG85-LZCY; Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling: With Fed-
eral Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 693–94 (2012) (arguing 
that a recent DOJ memorandum indicates that states will be given more freedom to regulate their own 
Internet gambling). 
 13 See Aaron Craig, Gambling on the Internet, 1998 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 61, 67, 82–83 
(arguing that PASPA is frequently violated by common office pools for the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association (NCAA) basketball tournament); Nicole Davidson, Internet Gambling: Should Fan-
tasy Sports Leagues Be Prohibited?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 202 (2002) (noting that an estimated 
30 million people play fantasy sports). Although participation in fantasy sports leagues and college 
brackets may include nonpaying contestants, it is argued that contestants competing for prizes—
especially cash prizes—may be in violation of federal law. See Davidson, supra at 206–10 (arguing 
that fantasy sports players are engaged in interstate gambling in violation of the Wire Act). 
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pants including the U.S. President14 and a former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice.15 
In 2012, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Sports Wagering Law—
which permits sports pools at New Jersey gaming casinos—in hopes of attract-
ing a percentage of this sports gambling income to the Garden State.16 After en-
actment, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the four ma-
jor American professional sports organizations challenged the law, arguing that it 
was in direct conflict with PASPA.17 In response, New Jersey contended that 
PASPA was unconstitutional because it violated the equal sovereignty doctrine.18 
Under this doctrine, federal legislation cannot discriminate among states unless 
Congress can show the burden is sufficiently related to the problem the legisla-
tion targets.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Andy Katz, Presidential Pick ’em at the White House, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2009), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney09/columns/story?columnist=katz_ andy&id=3991859, archived 
at http://perma.cc/U66-QGR3. Interestingly, during his reelection campaign in 2012, President Barack 
Obama tapped into the popularity of NCAA tournament gambling by operating a bracket challenge on 
his campaign website. See Ben Cohen, Obama Unveils Election-Year Bracket, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 
2012, 11:29 AM), blogs.wsj.com/dailyfix/2012/03/ 14/president-obama-unveils-ncaa-tournament-bracket, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7P7R-E79L. 
 15 Chad Millman, Fight For Sports Betting Rages On, ESPN, http://insider.espn.go.com/
insider/insider/news/story?id=4841822, archived at http://perma.cc/TSQ5-WYHD (last updated Jan. 
21, 2010, 7:27 AM) (reporting that former Chief Justice William Rehnquist organized March Madness 
pools for money). 
 16 Cf. Act effective Jan. 17, 2012, ch. 231, § 2(a), 2011 N.J. Laws 1723, 1724–25 (codified at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2(a) (West 2012)); Colton Totland, New Jersey Puts Money on Legalizing Sports 
Betting, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/13/nj-makes-
constitutional-case-sports-betting, archived at http://perma.cc/HJ85-5WHS (reporting that according 
to New Jersey officials, sports betting would generate $120 million each year and thousands of jobs 
for the state). 
 17 NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J.), aff’d 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). The 
National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League 
(NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB) each joined the NCAA as plaintiffs. Id. 
 18 Id. at 554 n.23. 
 19 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)); see also John M. Powers, Statistical Evidence of Racially Po-
larized Voting in the Obama Elections, and Implications for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 102 
GEO. L.J. 881, 918–19 (2014) (outlining the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder). 
This doctrine originates from Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 
U.S. 559, 566–67 (1911) (holding that the states are equal in power and sovereignty (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 4)). See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”). The Supreme Court has noted that the 
equal sovereignty doctrine also derives its power from the Tenth Amendment. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (noting that the Tenth Amendment protects the sovereignty of the states, 
and it ensures they remain equal in power and dignity). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
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In 2013, in NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld PASPA’s constitutionality and 
preempted New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.20 The Third Circuit held that the 
equal sovereignty doctrine did not apply to economic regulations, even when 
they discriminate among states.21 In so holding, the court noted that the Com-
merce Clause did not require geographic uniformity.22 Accordingly, PASPA, an 
economic regulation passed under the Commerce Clause, did not violate the 
equal sovereignty doctrine.23 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should apply the equal sovereign-
ty doctrine to economic regulations that discriminate among states and were en-
acted under the Commerce Clause.24 Accordingly, this Note contends that the 
proper way to analyze discriminatory economic regulations is to determine 
whether the discriminate treatment of states is sufficiently related to the legisla-
tion’s targeted issues.25 In order for a statute’s unequal treatment of states to be 
upheld, Congress must establish that the issues addressed are limited geograph-
ically to the targeted states and does not appear in the exempted states.26 Despite 
the Third Circuit’s holding to the contrary, applying the equal sovereignty doc-
trine to economic regulations is proper because it is faithful to the Supreme 
Court’s recent equal sovereignty jurisprudence, reinforces the Commerce 
Clause’s principle of uniformity, and reaffirms equality among the states.27 Un-
der this Note’s approach, PASPA’s disparate treatment of states violates the equal 
sovereignty doctrine because the nation’s sports gambling problem is not limited 
to the states affected by PASPA, and the grandfather clause contradicts Con-
gress’s intent to prohibit state-sponsored sports gambling.28 
                                                                                                                           
 20 730 F.3d at 240 (holding that PASPA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate com-
merce and therefore preempts New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law). 
 21 See id. at 238. 
 22 Id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes”). Congress has 
considerable latitude to regulate commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 
(2000) (holding that Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the in-
struments of interstate commerce, or the intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (1995) (noting that Con-
gress has considerable leeway when enacting regulations pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority); 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–57 (1964) (outlining Congress’s 
broad power to regulate under the Commerce Clause). 
 23 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 240. 
 24 See infra notes 123–198 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 123–198 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 159–181 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Supreme Court’s expand-
ed equal sovereignty doctrine should apply to discriminatory economic regulations). 
 27 See infra notes 129–181 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 182–198 and accompanying text. 
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Part I of this Note describes PASPA’s legislative history and the Supreme 
Court’s equal sovereignty jurisprudence.29 Part II examines the Third Circuit’s 
approach to the equal sovereignty doctrine as applied to PASPA in NCAA.30 Fi-
nally, Part III proposes an analytical framework to be used by courts applying 
the equal sovereignty doctrine to economic regulations enacted under the Com-
merce Clause.31 Under this approach, this Note contends that PASPA is not suf-
ficiently related to the problem that it targets and therefore violates the equal 
sovereignty doctrine.32 
I. PASPA AND THE EXPANDED EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE 
The equal sovereignty doctrine originates from Article IV, Section 4 of 
the U.S. Constitution.33 Initially referred to as part of the equal footing princi-
ple, the equal sovereignty doctrine enforced the guaranty that new states would 
be admitted to the Union on equal footing with the original 13 colonies.34 Re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted the equal sovereignty doc-
trine as deriving its authority from the Tenth Amendment, a shift away from 
the context of new statehood.35 This shift in focus created inconsistency in ju-
dicial analysis of the equal sovereignty doctrine.36 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 33–85 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 86–122 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 123–198 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 123–198 and accompanying text. 
 33 See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 566–67 (holding that the states are equal in power and sovereignty (cit-
ing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4)). See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guar-
antee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”). 
 34 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845) (holding that Alabama entered the 
Union on equal footing with the original colonies and therefore was entitled to sovereignty over all of 
its jurisdiction to the same extent as Georgia (citing U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 1)). See generally 
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o [newly admitted state] shall be formed or erected within the Ju-
risdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts 
of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Con-
gress.”). In defining the equal footing doctrine, the Court held that any states formed within the land of 
the original thirteen colonies were entitled to the same sovereign jurisdictional rights as possessed by the 
original thirteen colonies. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 228–29. 
 35 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (outlining the equal sovereignty doctrine (citing U.S. 
CONST. amend. X); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (noting that the 
Tenth Amendment protects the sovereignty of the states, and it ensures they remain equal in power 
and dignity)). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 36 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–31 (relying on the Tenth Amendment and holding 
that an act’s disparate geographic treatment must be shown to be sufficiently related to its targeted 
problems), with id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (illustrating uncertainty); NCAA, 730 F.3d at 
216, 240 (limiting the scope of the equal sovereignty doctrine). In contrast to the Shelby County ma-
jority, Judge Richard Posner has argued that the equal sovereignty doctrine does not exist. Richard A. 
Posner, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.
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In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded the equal sovereignty doctrine to strike down section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).37 In so holding, the Court concluded that any 
disparate treatment of states is unconstitutional unless Congress can prove that 
the legislation’s discrimination is sufficiently related to its targeted problem.38 
Today, questions remain whether statutes such as PASPA—which treats states 
unequally—remain valid after Shelby County.39 
This Part outlines PASPA and the recent developments in the equal sover-
eignty doctrine.40 Section A describes PASPA’s legislative history and statutory 
language.41 Section B then discusses the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of 
the equal sovereignty doctrine in Shelby County.42 Section B then concludes by 
discussing the dissenting opinion in Shelby County, which suggests that the ma-
jority’s holding renders PASPA unconstitutional.43 
A. The Enactment of PASPA 
In 1992, Congress enacted PASPA to curb the spread of state-sponsored 
sports gambling.44 PASPA prohibits states from sponsoring, licensing, or author-
izing sports lotteries or any other type of sports betting based on professional or 
amateur games.45 Congress determined that the morally corrosive effect of sports 
                                                                                                                           
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_
supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/4U7S-PU27. Other scholars agree with the Shelby County majority, arguing that the doctrine 
renders PASPA unconstitutional. See Joshua Winneker et al., Sports Gambling and the Expanded 
Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J., 38, 53 (2013). 
 37 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24, 2630–31 (holding that although the equal sovereignty doctrine previous-
ly barred differential treatment only in the context of the admission of a new state, the doctrine in fact 
remains pertinent in assessing the general disparate treatment of states); see infra notes 63–77 and 
accompanying text (expounding on the VRA and the majority’s analysis of the equal sovereignty 
doctrine). 
 38 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–31 (holding that an act’s disparate geographic treatment must 
be shown to be sufficiently related to its targeted problems). 
 39 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the expanded equal sovereignty 
doctrine places numerous statutes, including PASPA, on shaky constitutional ground). 
 40 See infra notes 44–85 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 59–85 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 44 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991). See generally Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)). 
 45 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1)–(2). Specifically, under § 3072, a governmental entity cannot “sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact,” a “lottery, sweepstakes, or other 
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly . . . , on one or more competitive 
games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or 
more performances of such athletes in such games.” Id. 
1016 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1009 
gambling on America’s youth and sports justified federal action.46 According to 
Congress, state-by-state prohibitions were insufficient because the moral erosion 
produced could not be contained within state borders.47 Furthermore, Congress 
concluded that without a federal prohibition on sports wagering, budgetary defi-
cits could entice state officials to sanction sports gambling in order to raise reve-
nue.48 
Although PASPA prohibits all state-operated or state-sanctioned sports 
gambling, it contains a grandfather clause, which carves out an exception for 
states that allowed or operated a sports betting scheme between 1976 and 
1990.49 This grandfather clause exempted sports lottery schemes in Oregon and 
Delaware and casino sports gambling in Nevada.50 Because Congress intended 
only to curb the spread of state-sponsored sports gambling, PASPA does not ap-
ply to states retroactively.51 
Because of its discriminatory application and numerous ad hoc exemptions, 
PASPA faced strong opposition in the U.S. Senate.52 According to critics, PASPA 
represented a substantial intrusion into states’ rights, for example, by restricting 
states’ fundamental right to raise revenue.53 One senator argued that the grandfa-
ther clause effectively granted Nevada a federal monopoly over the $1.8 billion 
American sports gambling industry.54 Other states exempted under PASPA, such 
                                                                                                                           
 46 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 7; accord Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Policy 
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 5–6 (1992) (arguing that American 
society cannot allow states to sanction sports gambling in order to raise revenue). Senator Bradley was 
one of PASPA’s main supporters. See Bradley, supra at 5–6. 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (stating that § 3702 shall not apply to a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a state at any time between 1976 and 1990); see also 
Shur, supra note 6, at 100 (explaining that PASPA’s exemption covered Oregon, Delaware, Montana, 
and Nevada). 
 50 See Shur, supra note 6, at 102, 113. One Senate Report notes that this exemption was added 
because the Committee did not want to threaten Nevada’s economy. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991). 
Many have viewed this grandfather clause skeptically, arguing that the it was implemented to promote 
a closed-market scheme for Nevada’s gaming industry. See Jason Goldstein, Take the Money Line: 
PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Integrity of the Game, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 366, 
367 (2012); Waddell & Minke, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that protection of Nevada’s gambling 
industry was the primary purpose behind PASPA). 
 51 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (noting that although the committee firmly believed that all such 
sports gambling was harmful, it had no wish to apply this new prohibition “retroactively”). See gener-
ally 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (codifying the grandfather clause). 
 52 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (explaining that the DOJ and several interests groups vehemently 
opposed PASPA); see also Bradley, supra note 48, at 11 n.24 (outlining the arguments of PASPA’s 
critics). 
 53 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12–13. Senator Charles Grassley took issue with PASPA’s grandfather 
clause, as he found there to be no rational basis for allowing sports wagering in three states, while 
prohibiting the activity in the forty-seven other states. Id. 
 54 Id. at 12. 
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as Oregon, enjoyed similar financial benefits in their respective gambling schemes.55 
Nevertheless, numerous states that expressed interest in developing similar programs 
were prohibited from enacting legislation identical to Oregon’s sports lottery.56 In 
contrast, Delaware received an exemption from PASPA’s prohibition even though it 
had not conducted any form of sports wagering in twenty-five years.57 Finally, PAS-
PA’s disparate coverage raised federalism concerns, which led the U.S. Department 
of Justice, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Counsel of State 
Governments to oppose the legislation vigorously.58 
B. Shelby County v. Holder: The Supreme Court Expands  
the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine 
In the 2013 case Shelby County, the Supreme Court—in a 5–4 opinion—
expanded the scope of the equal sovereignty doctrine to cover all disparate 
treatment of states.59 In striking down a provision of the VRA,60 the Supreme 
Court held that a departure from the equal sovereignty doctrine can only be justi-
fied by a demonstration that the statute’s unequal treatment of states is sufficient-
ly related to the problem that the legislation seeks to remedy.61 In her dissent, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg contended that the majority’s holding contradicted 
the Court’s equal sovereignty doctrine precedent and suggested that the expand-
ed doctrine would render statutes such as PASPA unconstitutional.62 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Waddell & Minke, supra note 8, at 35–36 (observing that Oregon, Delaware, and Montana 
each benefitted from PASPA exemptions); cf. Galasso, supra note 4, at 168–69 (noting that Oregon’s 
sports betting lottery generated $12.7 million in 2007). In 2007, this revenue provided $2.9 million in 
funding to Oregon schools. Id. at 169. 
 56 See Meer, supra note 9, at 290 (observing that since 2009, the states of New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, Missouri, and Iowa—each prohibited from legalizing sports gambling—have taken measures 
to legalize sports gambling or have called upon Congress to repeal PASPA). 
 57 See id. at 289. Delaware was able to capitalize on PASPA’s grandfather clause because alt-
hough the state had not engaged in sports gambling for twenty-five years, Delaware had nevertheless 
enacted a sports lottery that predated PASPA. See MLB v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295–96 (3d Cir. 
2009) (noting that in 2009, Delaware legalized the sports gambling scheme that was last active in 
1976). 
 58 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12–13 (1991). The DOJ stated that PASPA raised federalism issues 
because it permitted private sports organizations to enforce the legislation’s provisions, intruded into 
the traditional state right of determining how to raise revenue, and facially discriminated between 
states. See id. Despite these concerns, PASPA passed the Senate. See Bradley, supra note 48, at 5–6. 
 59 133 S. Ct. at 2627–31 (holding requirement portion of the VRA unconstitutional because it 
violated the equal sovereignty doctrine). 
 60 See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2620 (2013). 
 61 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 62 See id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena 
Kagan joined in this dissent. Id. at 2632. 
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1. The Majority Opinion: Expanding the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine 
According to the Shelby County majority, the equal sovereignty doctrine 
applies to all disparate treatment of states, not only to the terms on which states 
are admitted to the Union.63 Although the Court acknowledged that it previously 
rejected the notion that the equal sovereignty doctrine operated as a bar on the 
discriminate treatment of states,64 the Court nonetheless held that the equal sov-
ereignty doctrine remains highly pertinent in subsequent disparate treatment of 
states.65 This is because the equal sovereignty doctrine ensures equality among 
the states, which is essential to the harmonious operation of the republic.66 Ac-
cordingly, the majority concluded that a departure from the equal sovereignty 
doctrine can only be justified in exceptional cases by showing that a statute’s 
disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.67 
Under the equal sovereignty doctrine, the Shelby County Court held that the 
VRA section 4(b)’s disparate treatment of states was not justified because the 
VRA’s coverage formula—namely, the imposition of increased restrictions on 
certain states—failed to address the current conditions of voter discrimination.68 
In enacting the VRA, Congress sought primarily to forbid discriminatory proce-
dures that denied any citizen the right to vote on account of race.69 In addition to 
this nationwide prohibition,70 Congress enacted further requirements for specific 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (noting that the 2009 U.S. Supreme Court case Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District v. Holder clarifies that the equal sovereignty doctrine remains highly perti-
nent in assessing any disparate treatment of states). See generally Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (hold-
ing that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a 
statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it targets”). 
 64 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (noting that the Court has previously rejected the notion 
that the equal sovereignty doctrine “operated as a bar on differential treatment” outside the context of 
the admission of a new state (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)); 
accord Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29 (finding that “[t]he doctrine of equality of States . . . applies 
only to the terms upon which States are admitted, and not to the remedies for local evils which have 
subsequently appeared.”), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
 65 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624; accord Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (holding that although the 
equal sovereignty doctrine remains highly pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of states, the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance required the court to hold on other grounds). 
 66 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567). 
 67 Id. at 2630. 
 68 See id. at 2631–32 (concluding that the conditions that originally justified the VRA no longer 
characterized the states targeted under the VRA’s coverage formula). See generally 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (imposing heightened VRA requirements on a specific subset of 
states). 
 69 Cf. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973a (2006)) (prohibiting voting qualifications that may deny or abridge an 
individual’s right to vote on account of race or color). 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (authorizing the appointment of federal observers to enforce voting rights in 
any state if a court determines that the challenged voting procedures denied an aggrieved individual’s 
right to vote). 
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states that historically implemented discriminatory voting procedures.71 Intended 
as temporary measures to address areas with the most flagrant history of voter 
discrimination,72 section 5 forbid changes to voting procedures in the states iden-
tified by section 4(b)’s coverage formula until such changes were approved by 
specified federal authorities (the “preclearance requirement”).73 
The majority opinion reemphasized the Court’s long-held view that the VRA 
represented a drastic departure from basic federalism principles.74 For example, 
in 1966, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court held that although 
section 4(b)’s disparate treatment and section 5’s preclearance requirement repre-
sented an uncommon exercise of congressional power, the legislation was justi-
fied under the Fifteenth Amendment to address exceptional conditions of voter 
discrimination.75 The majority in Shelby County concluded that these examples of 
voter discrimination were no longer present exclusively in the states targeted by 
VRA 4(b)’s coverage formula.76 Therefore, the disparate treatment of these states 
under section 5’s preclearance requirements no longer remained justified.77 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Compare § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438 (imposing certain additional stringent requirements to areas 
covered by section 4(b)), with id. § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438 (confining these stringent requirements to 
areas that implemented discriminatory testing prior to the enactment), and Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 
222–23 (observing that the most stringent requirements of the VRA only applied to certain states and 
counties). Specifically, section 4 abolished all literacy tests and similar voter-qualification tests. Id. 
§ 4(c), 79 Stat. at 438 In addition, the Act empowered federal authorities to override state determinations 
on voter eligibility. Id. § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438; Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 198. Furthermore, these provi-
sions were strengthened by section 5, which suspended all new voting regulations until they were re-
viewed by the federal government to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimina-
tion. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. Finally, the Act confined these stringent 
requirements to areas of rampant disenfranchisement. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 222 (describing the cov-
erage formula of section 4(b)). As a result, Sections 4 and 5 only applied to certain states and counties. 
Id. at 222–23. In 1965, these states included South Carolina, Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Virginia. Id.; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 318. 
 72 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 73 Id. (noting that section 5 “provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect” in 
states covered by section 4 “until it was approved by federal authorities”); see § 5, 79 Stat. at 439. 
 74 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624. See generally Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202 (emphasizing that 
the VRA is extraordinary legislation and raises significant federalism concerns); Lopez v. Monterey 
Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the VRA’s interference with 
state sovereignty is “quite drastic”), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; Presley v. Etowah 
Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1991) (noting that the VRA represents an extraordinary depar-
ture from the traditional course of relations among the states and the federal government). 
 75 383 U.S. at 328–29. The Court read the Fifteenth Amendment as giving Congress substantial 
deference to create targeted legislation to remedy discriminatory voting procedures. See id. at 324. See 
generally U.S. CONST. amend. XV (providing that “[t]he Right of citizens in the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by . . . any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude,” and granting Congress “the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”). 
 76 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (concluding that Congress failed to update the coverage 
formula to address the current conditions of voter discrimination). 
 77 See id. at 2623 (holding that the VRA violates the equal sovereignty doctrine). 
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2. The Dissenting Opinion: Justice Ginsburg Predicts PASPA’s Demise 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion contended that the application of the 
equal sovereignty doctrine is limited to the context of states joining the Union.78 
Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of ignoring the Court’s precedent and ex-
tending the equal sovereignty doctrine outside of its proper domain.79 According 
to the Shelby County dissent, the Katzenbach Court expressly held that the equal 
sovereignty doctrine applied only to the admission of new states and not to sub-
sequent unequal treatment.80 Therefore, the dissent contended that the VRA re-
mained an appropriate congressional action under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
despite the disparate treatment of states.81 
The dissent disagreed with the majority that a statute’s disparate treatment 
of states must be sufficiently related to the legislation’s targeted problems.82 
Under the test outlined by the majority, the Court will only uphold discrimina-
tory legislation upon a showing that the act sufficiently addresses a continuing 
problem found exclusively within the targeted states.83 As a result, the dissent 
explained that this expanded test may render other legislation beyond the VRA 
unconstitutional.84 The dissent reasoned that Congress’s choice to enact legis-
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Compare Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29 (holding that 
the equal sovereignty doctrine applies only to the terms upon which a state is admitted to the Union—
not to remedy local evils which have subsequently appeared), and Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567 (noting that 
the equal sovereignty doctrine applies only to the terms upon which a state is admitted to the Union), 
with Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (noting that the equal sovereignty doctrine remains highly perti-
nent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of states). 
 79 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority 
“veer[ed] away from controlling precedent”). 
 80 Id. at 2649 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29). 
 81 See id. at 2651–52. 
 82 Id. at 2649 (contending that the equal sovereignty doctrine is limited to the context of newly 
formed states and does not apply to subsequent disparate treatment of states). Although the majority 
relied on language from Northwest Austin—an opinion joined by two Shelby County dissenters—
stating that the disparate treatment of states requires must be sufficiently related to a legislation’s 
targeted problems, the dissent dismissed this as dictum and argued that the majority’s reliance upon it 
was untenable. See id. (opining “[i]f the Court is suggesting that dictum in Northwest Austin silently 
overruled Katzenbach’s limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to ‘the admission of new states,’ 
the suggestion is untenable”). See generally Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and 
the Voting Rights Act: Getting the Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 
241 (2012) (explaining that the Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional challenge in Northwest 
Austin). Instead, the dissent contended that stare decisis required the Court to adhere to Katzenbach’s 
ruling on the limited significance of the equal sovereignty doctrine. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See generally Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29 (holding that the equal sov-
ereignty doctrine does not apply to legislation that is intentionally confined to a small number of 
states). 
 83 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203); see also id. at 2649–50 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s holding creates a dual burden on proponents of 
the challenged legislation). 
 84 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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lation that treats states differently, including PASPA, is common and reflects 
the notion that such actions do not violate the equal sovereignty doctrine.85 
II. NEW JERSEY CHALLENGES PASPA UNDER EXPANDED EQUAL 
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE 
In September 2013, in NCAA v Governor of New Jersey, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to address the consti-
tutionality of PASPA.86 In upholding PASPA’s constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause, the Third Circuit determined that gambling on professional and 
amateur sporting events is an economic activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce.87 The court held that because Congress had a rational basis to 
prohibit state licensing of this activity, PASPA was within Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power.88 
In NCAA, the Third Circuit was the first court to apply the Supreme Court’s 
recently expanded interpretation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.89 The court 
acknowledged that PASPA discriminated among states, but ultimately held that it 
did not violate the equal sovereignty doctrine.90 Although the Supreme Court’s 
2013 holding in Shelby County v. Holder stated that the equal sovereignty doc-
trine applies to all disparate treatment of states, the Third Circuit concluded that 
the Supreme Court did not intend the doctrine to apply outside sensitive areas of 
state and local policymaking.91 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. 
 86 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 87 Id. at 224 (holding that Congress may regulate state-licensed wagering on sports consistent 
with the Commerce Clause). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the author-
ity to regulate commerce among the states); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151–55 (1971) 
(noting that Congress’s broad power under the Commerce Clause extends to the regulation of intra-
state economic activities if they exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce). 
 88 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 225 (holding that prohibiting state licensing of gambling is a rational means 
of regulating an economic activity). 
 89 See id. at 238 (determining PASPA’s constitutionality in light of the 2013 Supreme Court case 
Shelby County v. Holder). Whereas the Third Circuit addressed and narrowed Shelby County’s equal 
sovereignty analysis, id. at 216, 240, the district court declined to apply the equal sovereignty doctrine 
on separate grounds. See NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 571 n.23 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, 730 
F.3d 208. First, the district court dismissed the 2009 Supreme Court case Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District v. Holder as dicta. Id. Second, the court held that the 1911 Supreme Court case Coyle 
v. Smith limited the doctrine to the context of newly-admitted states. Id. 
 90 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239. 
 91 Compare Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (noting that an act’s disparate 
geographic treatment must be sufficiently related to its targeted problems (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)), with NCAA, 730 F.3d at 216, 240 (noting that alt-
hough PASPA permits Nevada to license widespread sports gambling while banning other states from 
doing so, the law does not violate the equal sovereignty doctrine because gambling is not a sensitive 
area of local policymaking). 
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This Part examines the Third Circuit’s analysis of the equal sovereignty 
doctrine in NCAA.92 Section A discusses the court’s narrow interpretation of 
Shelby County and analyzes the court’s holding that the equal sovereignty doc-
trine does not apply outside sensitive areas of local policymaking.93 Section B 
then discusses the Third Circuit’s conclusion that PASPA does not violate the 
equal sovereignty doctrine.94 Section B then analyzes the court’s conclusion that 
even if applied, PASPA’s disparate treatment of states is sufficiently related to 
the problem it targets.95 
A. The Third Circuit’s Narrow Interpretation of Shelby County  
and the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine 
The Third Circuit in NCAA concluded that the equal sovereignty doctrine 
was a narrow principle limited to intrusive federal regulation of elections.96 Un-
like the VRA, the Third Circuit noted, PASPA represented a straightforward eco-
nomic regulation enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power.97 
The court started its analysis of the equal sovereignty doctrine by framing the 
Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Shelby County and the 2009 case Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District v. Holder as limited in scope.98 Both cases ad-
dressed the VRA, which, the Third Circuit noted, was extraordinary legislation.99 
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Shelby 
County struck down section 4(b) of the VRA under the equal sovereignty doc-
trine, the court declined to extend the Supreme Court’s holding further.100 
Furthermore, according to the Third Circuit, the fact that section 5 of the 
VRA has survived the equal sovereignty doctrine on multiple occasions indicates 
that the equal sovereignty doctrine only bars differential treatment of states in 
exceptional cases.101 The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has twice 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See infra notes 96–122 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 105–122 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 105–122 and accompanying text. 
 96 See 730 F.3d at 238. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 237–38 (outlining the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of the equal sovereignty doctrine). 
 99 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (noting that the VRA sharply departed from the basic 
principles of equal sovereignty), and Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (concluding that the VRA’s dispar-
ate treatment of states creates federalism concerns), with NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238 (noting that the Su-
preme Court concluded that the VRA is an uncommon exercise of congressional power). 
 100 See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 216, 240 (noting that although PASPA permits Nevada to license 
widespread sports gambling while banning other states from doing so, the law does not violate the 
equal sovereignty doctrine). 
 101 See id. at 238–39 (concluding that the equal sovereignty doctrine’s narrow scope is demon-
strated by the Supreme Court’s refusal to strike down section 5 of the VRA). See generally Shelby 
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (declining to hold section 5 of the VRA unconstitutional despite its disparate 
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in recent years raised federalism concerns with section 5 of the VRA, but de-
clined to hold that the provision violates the equal sovereignty doctrine.102 Alt-
hough Shelby County marked a shift in equal sovereignty jurisprudence, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the fact that the doctrine has never been applied to 
federal legislation other than the VRA is evidence of the equal sovereignty doc-
trine’s narrow scope.103 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the Shelby 
County Court intended the expanded equal sovereignty doctrine to apply only to 
the narrow context of local policymaking that the Framers intended to reserve to 
the states.104 
B. The Third Circuit Finds PASPA’s Disparate Treatment of States Justified 
In holding that the equal sovereignty doctrine does not apply to economic 
regulations, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress could treat states unequal-
ly through legislation passed under the Commerce Clause.105 The court noted 
that unlike Congress’s other enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause does not 
require uniformity in its application.106 The Third Circuit reasoned that the 
                                                                                                                           
treatment of states); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203–04 (noting that section 5 raises serious constitutional 
questions, but holding on other grounds). Recall that section 5 of the VRA requires states and munici-
palities subject to section 4(b)’s coverage formula to preclear “any voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006); see 
also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 
176 & n.10 (2007) (outlining the VRA preclearance requirements). 
 102 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237–38; see Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627, 2631; Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 
at 203, 211. 
 103 See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238, 240. See generally Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 240 (noting that the 
equal sovereignty doctrine has only been applied in two modern Supreme Court cases, Shelby County 
and Northwest Austin, both of which addressed the VRA). Although the Court in Shelby County cited 
its 1911 decision in Coyle, the Third Circuit interpreted Coyle as a separate doctrine. Compare Shelby 
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (noting that Coyle first outlined the equal sovereignty doctrine), with 
NCAA, 730 F.3d at 240 n.19 (noting that Coyle relied on the equal footing principle, not the equal 
sovereignty doctrine). Recall that the equal footing principle required newly admitted states to be enti-
tled to the same sovereign jurisdictional rights as possessed by the original thirteen colonies. See Pollard 
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845) (holding that Alabama entered the union on equal 
footing with the original colonies and therefore was entitled to sovereignty over all of its jurisdiction 
to the same extent as Georgia). 
 104 See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238–39 (holding that there is “nothing in Shelby County to indicate 
that the equal sovereignty principle is meant to apply with the same force outside the context of sensi-
tive areas of state and local policymaking,” such as an area the Framers intended to reserve for the 
states (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (contending that the majority extended the equal sovereignty doctrine outside its precedent). 
 105 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238. 
 106 Id. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (requiring uniformity in duties and imports), and 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (requiring uniformity in regulation of state ports), with U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the states without an explicit 
requirement of uniformity), and Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 389 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (noting that the Commerce Clause does not require uniformity). 
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Founders did not require uniformity because Congress exercises its powers un-
der the Commerce Clause to address matters of national concern.107 According 
to the court, solutions to national concerns inevitably affect states differently.108 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County held that dispar-
ate treatment of states required equal sovereignty analysis, the Third Circuit’s 
removal of economic regulations from this realm renders all such regulations 
constitutional so long as Congress has a rational basis to conclude that the eco-
nomic legislation addresses the targeted problem.109 Although limited by consti-
tutional requirements, Congress possesses extensive authority to regulate eco-
nomic activity under the Commerce Clause.110 That courts review economic leg-
islation under a rational basis standard further augments Congress’s dominance 
in the Commerce Clause arena.111 
In addition to finding that the expanded equal sovereignty doctrine implicit-
ly applied only to legislation akin to the VRA—and therefore not economic leg-
islation—the Third Circuit further noted that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Northwest Austin explicitly left room for exceptions to the equal sovereignty 
analysis.112 In Northwest Austin, the Supreme Court stated that disparate treat-
ment of states may at times be justified, as the equal sovereignty doctrine does 
not bar remedies for local evils that have appeared subsequent to a state’s admis-
                                                                                                                           
 107 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238 (noting that regulations enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause are 
national in scope). Other examples of how the U.S. government has relied on the Commerce Clause to 
target areas of national concern include the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 101, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (declaring that the production and 
distribution of illicit drugs have a substantial detrimental impact on the welfare of the American peo-
ple, and regulation of intrastate traffic is essential for effective control over interstate traffic); ADA 
§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (finding that discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists on a national level, which costs the U.S. government billions of dollars resulting 
from dependency). 
 108 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239. 
 109 See id. at 224, 240 (holding that economic regulations enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause are constitutional as long as they have a rational basis). 
 110 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Com-
merce Clause authority is broad); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (noting that 
although it is subject to constitutional limitations, the Commerce Clause is interpreted broadly); see 
also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1991) (noting that the Commerce Clause gives Con-
gress broad powers to impose its will on states, but does not give Congress the power to limit states’ 
sovereignty). 
 111 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (observing 
that rational basis is a weak test and noting that Congress has expansive powers under the Commerce 
Clause). The rational basis test calls for a low level of judicial scrutiny. Id. Under this test, legislation 
possesses a presumption of constitutionality if the court finds any rational basis for Congress to conclude 
that the legislation will address the identified issue. Id. 
 112 Id. at 238–39; see supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text (illustrating the Third Circuit’s 
argument that because the recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the expanded equal sovereignty 
doctrine dealt exclusively with the VRA, the doctrine was impliedly limited to that narrow context). 
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sion to the Union.113 The Third Circuit viewed this exception as one of many 
instances that justified a departure from the equal sovereignty doctrine.114 There-
fore, the Third Circuit concluded that Northwest Austin explicitly left room for 
the court to hold economic regulations as a justified departure from equal sover-
eignty doctrine.115 
Moreover, the Third Circuit held that even if the equal sovereignty doctrine 
applied to legislation passed under the Commerce Clause, PASPA’s disparate 
treatment of states is sufficiently related its the targeted problem.116 The court 
reasoned that PASPA’s purpose was not to eliminate sports gambling altogether, 
but to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling.117 As a result, PASPA 
targeted only those states without state-sanctioned sports gambling legislation.118 
Therefore, the court concluded, PASPA is precisely tailored to address the prob-
lem it targets.119 
Finally, the Third Circuit also disagreed with New Jersey’s contention that 
PASPA’s preferential treatment of Nevada creates the kind of disparate treatment 
that would violate the equal sovereignty doctrine.120 The court read the equal 
sovereignty doctrine to apply only to legislation that singled out a handful of 
states for disfavored treatment.121 Although Shelby County expanded the equal 
sovereignty doctrine, the Third Circuit maintained that the doctrine does not pre-
vent Congress from treating a few states more favorably than the rest.122 
                                                                                                                           
 113 557 U.S. at 203. 
 114 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238–39 (concluding that the Supreme Court intended to create several 
exceptions to the equal sovereignty doctrine). 
 115 Id. The Court in Northwest Austin, however, arguably did not leave any room for distinctions 
among types of legislation. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (“[A] departure from the fundamental princi-
ple of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is suffi-
ciently related to the problem that it targets.”). 
 116 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238–39 (holding that PASPA is precisely tailored to address the spread of 
sports gambling). 
 117 Id. But see Bradley, supra note 48, at 9 (explaining that the legislative purpose behind PASPA 
is to stop the spread of sports gambling and the promotion of sports gambling among the nation’s 
youth). 
 118 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239 (holding that PASPA is sufficiently related to the problem it targets). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (distinguishing PASPA’s preferential treatment of states from the VRA’s disfavorable 
treatment of states). 
 121 See id. 
 122 Id. at 240. It is this Note’s position, however, that the Supreme Court did not distinguish be-
tween negative and preferential treatment of targeted states. See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (holding 
that all disparate treatment of states requires application of the equal sovereignty doctrine). 
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III. SOVEREIGNTY, EQUALLY APPLIED: THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE 
EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE TO COMMERCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION 
In upholding the constitutionality of PASPA, the Third Circuit misinterpret-
ed Supreme Court jurisprudence and missed an opportunity to clarify the equal 
sovereignty doctrine’s application to economic regulations.123 This Part contends 
that the expanded equal sovereignty doctrine should apply to Commerce Clause 
analyses if the contested legislation facially discriminates among states.124 Under 
this new standard of review, PASPA violates the equal sovereignty doctrine be-
cause the burdens imposed are not sufficiently related to the current spread of 
sports gambling.125 Section A details how Supreme Court precedent instructs 
courts to apply the equal sovereignty doctrine analysis to all disparate treatment 
of states, including economic regulations.126 Section B proposes a mode of anal-
ysis courts should apply when analyzing the equal sovereignty doctrine in the 
context of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.127 Finally, Section C argues 
that when the equal sovereignty doctrine is applied properly, PASPA is not suffi-
ciently related to the problem it targets and therefore violates the equal sover-
eignty doctrine.128 
A. Focus on the Treatment: The Supreme Court’s Equal Sovereignty 
Jurisprudence Requires Courts to Broadly Apply the Doctrine 
In expanding the equal sovereignty doctrine, the Supreme Court in 2013 
in Shelby County v. Holder expressly stated that disparate treatment of states 
required review under the equal sovereignty doctrine.129 The Court character-
                                                                                                                           
 123 Compare NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the equal 
sovereignty doctrine does not apply to statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause), with Shelby 
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013) (holding that a departure from the equal sovereignty 
doctrine requires a showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to 
the problem it targets (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009))), Id. 
at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority’s expanded interpretation of 
the equal sovereignty doctrine might strike down other federal legislation enacted under the Com-
merce Clause that treats states disparately), and Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court outlined the equal sovereignty doctrine in a broad fashion and was not directing it to 
be applied only to the specific situation of the VRA). 
 124 See infra notes 129–198 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 129–198 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 129–158 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 159–181 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 182–198 and accompanying text. 
 129 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (emphasizing that the equal sovereignty doctrine “requires an 
Act’s disparate geographical coverage to be sufficiently related to its targeted problems” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Winneker 
et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme Court outlined the equal sovereignty doctrine in 
a broad fashion and was not directing it to be applied only to the specific situation of the VRA). 
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ized the equal sovereignty doctrine as fundamental and noted that exceptions 
to the doctrine are only justified in certain limited cases—namely, when a stat-
ute’s disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the problem that it address-
es.130 Therefore, under the Supreme Court’s recent equal sovereignty doctrine 
jurisprudence, courts should apply the equal sovereignty doctrine to all legisla-
tion that discriminates among states, including economic legislation passed 
under the Commerce Clause.131 This approach is faithful to the Supreme 
Court’s 2013 holding in Shelby County v. Holder and preserves economic uni-
formity among the states.132 
In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2013 NCAA 
v. Governor of New Jersey opinion incorrectly concluded that the Supreme 
Court applied equal sovereignty doctrine to the VRA solely because it was an 
extraordinary congressional action and that the court’s analysis should only be 
applied in similar cases.133 Although the Supreme Court in Shelby County re-
peatedly characterized the VRA as extraordinary legislation,134 this description 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630. 
 131 See id. (adopting an explicitly general application of the equal sovereignty doctrine (quoting 
Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (illus-
trating that, even in the case of the highly discretionary rational basis test, Congress must still act 
within the bounds of the constitution); Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court intended the equal sovereignty doctrine to be applied broadly). See generally Thomas B. Colby, 
Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 342 
(2005) (arguing that PASPA’s disparate treatment of states is constitutionally suspect due to its dis-
parate treatment of states). 
 132 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (noting that the equal sovereignty doctrine is “fundamen-
tal” in assessment of disparate treatment of states); Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that the 
courts should revitalize a uniformity constraint on Commerce Clause analysis). Importantly, economic 
uniformity among the states was the original purpose of the Commerce Clause. See Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 227 (1899) (finding “the object of vesting in Congress the 
power to regulate interstate commerce was to insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and 
discriminating state legislation”); cf. Colby, supra note 131, at 314 (arguing that a main purpose for 
drafting the Constitution was to give Congress the power to adopt uniform trade policies). See gener-
ally Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870) (holding that Congress is forbidden from 
enacting discriminatory commercial or revenue regulations). In addition, the Supreme Court itself has 
commented on the importance of economic uniformity. Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 
U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (holding that “[t]his Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases . . . have invalidated 
statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regula-
tions”); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 385 (1946) (holding a local law unconstitutional because it 
interfered with the need for national uniformity in the regulations for interstate travel). 
 133 Compare NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239 (concluding that Shelby County instructs courts to apply the 
equal sovereignty doctrine only in the context of local policymaking), with Winneker et al., supra note 
36, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme Court outlined the equal sovereignty doctrine in a broad fashion 
and was not directing it to be applied only to the specific situation of the VRA). 
 134 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (noting the VRA’s extraordinary nature); accord Nw. 
Austin, 557 U.S. at 211 (characterizing the VRA as extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to 
the federal system). 
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refers to the VRA’s significant federalism concerns.135 Economic regulations 
enacted under the Commerce Clause may create similar federalism concerns—
i.e., may be just as extraordinary—by intruding into areas the Framers intend-
ed to reserve for the states.136 
Moreover, the Commerce Clause gives Congress less latitude than the 
Fifteenth Amendment—which was the basis for the VRA—because the Tenth 
Amendment prohibition on federal overreaching poses a greater restraint 
to laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause power than those passed un-
der the Reconstruction Amendments.137 Of course, the Commerce Clause does 
grant Congress wide latitude to enact legislation.138 Nevertheless, by transfus-
ing the Necessary and Proper Clause into the Reconstruction Amendments,139 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (noting that the VRA represents a drastic departure from 
basic principles of federalism); see also Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202 (emphasizing that the VRA is 
extraordinary legislation and raises significant federalism concerns); Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 
U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the VRA’s interference with state sover-
eignty is “quite drastic”), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; Presley v. Etowah Cnty. 
Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1991) (noting that the VRA represents an extraordinary departure 
from the traditional course of relations among the states and the federal government). 
 136 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (concluding that the Court must 
ensure that a regulation enacted under the Commerce Clause does not blur “the boundaries between 
the spheres of federal and state authority”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) 
(holding that an economic regulation of nuclear waste enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause was 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty). 
 137 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991) (noting that “the principles of federalism” 
that constrain the Commerce Clause “are attenuated” with acts enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179–80 (1980) (holding that principles of 
federalism and state sovereignty that otherwise restrain Congress are necessarily overridden by the 
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; Katherine 
A. Connolly, Note, Who’s Left Standing for State Sovereignty?: Private Party Standing to Raise Tenth 
Amendment Claims, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1539, 1545–46, 1546 & n.50 (2010) (arguing that although the 
Tenth Amendment has been held to have limited substantive effect on the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has bolstered the Tenth Amendment’s restraint on the 
Commerce Clause). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 744 (2009) (observing that the VRA was supported by the 
Fifteenth Amendment). 
 138 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Com-
merce Clause authority is broad); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565–66 (noting that Congress has considerable 
leeway when enacting regulations pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority); David G. Wille, The 
Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (1996) (arguing that the 
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause is expansive). 
 139 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467–68 (1953) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment was 
written with the express intent of encompassing the power of the Necessary and Proper Clause); cf. 
Erin Rosen, Note, An Occasion for a More Thorough Analysis: The New Findings Requirement and 
Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After United States v. Morrison, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 573, 591 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court utilizes the broad scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause when reviewing the VRA). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence grants Congress this same deference when re-
viewing legislation enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.140 In addi-
tion, the Tenth Amendment places much greater restraint on the Commerce 
Clause’s scope than it does the Fifteenth Amendment.141 This is because the 
Reconstruction Amendments were enacted after the Tenth Amendment with 
the specific purpose of limiting state autonomy.142 This is noteworthy because 
the Supreme Court has cited the Tenth Amendment as one of the equal sover-
eignty doctrine’s sources of authority.143 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that economic regulations enacted under the Commerce Clause are more sus-
ceptible to the equal sovereignty doctrine than legislation enacted under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, such as the VRA.144 
Furthermore, Shelby County requires that all departures from the principle 
of equal sovereignty demonstrate that the burden sufficiently relates to the 
                                                                                                                           
(granting Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United 
States”). 
 140 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 318 (1966) (holding that against the reserved 
powers of the state, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment), 
abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; Sudeep Paul, Comment, The Voting Rights Act’s Fight to 
Stay Rational: Shelby County v. Holder, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 271, 292 
(2013), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=djclpp_sidebar, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XLR6-P2T4 (explaining that the Supreme Court reviews legislation enact-
ed under the Reconstruction Amendments, such as the VRA, under the rational basis test); see also 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (noting that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause gives “Congress great latitude in exercising its powers”). 
 141 Compare City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179–80 (holding that principles of federalism and state sov-
ereignty that otherwise restrain Congress are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil 
War Amendments), with Connolly, supra note 137, at 1545–46, 1546 & n.50 (arguing that although the 
Tenth Amendment has been held to have limited substantive effect on the Reconstruction Amendments, 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has bolstered the Tenth Amendment’s restraint on the Commerce 
Clause), and Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Ex-
ception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 155 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce 
Clause analysis disfavors statutory interpretations that intrude on state sovereignty). 
 142 See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179–80 (noting that the Reconstruction Amendments “were 
specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty”). 
 143 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (relying on cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment and the 
Guarantee Clause in outlining equal sovereignty doctrine). 
 144 Compare Paul, supra note 140, at 292 (suggesting that Congress is entitled to similar defer-
ence under the Commerce Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment), with City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179–
80 (holding that principles of federalism and state sovereignty that otherwise restrain Congress are 
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments), United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 648 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Tenth Amendment places 
greater restraints on the Commerce Clause than the Reconstruction Amendments), and Connolly, 
supra note 137, at 1545–46, 1546 & n.50 (suggesting that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
bolstered the Tenth Amendment’s restraint on the Commerce Clause). 
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problem it targets.145 The Third Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
2009 decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Holder illus-
trated that “remedying local evils” is one of several exceptions to the equal 
sovereignty doctrine.146 The holding in Shelby County, however, does not leave 
room for such a broad justification for the unequal treatment of states.147 Alt-
hough Shelby County noted that disparate treatment may be justified in some 
cases,148 this exception was narrowly framed to explain why the VRA was ini-
tially justified under the equal sovereignty doctrine.149 The Court made clear 
that such a justification for disparate treatment required “exceptional condi-
tions.”150 Even if these exceptional conditions exist, the equal sovereignty doc-
trine still requires Congress to justify unequal treatment of states.151 Remedy-
ing local evil, therefore, serves merely as an example of appropriate measures 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622; see also Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing 
that the Supreme Court intended the equal sovereignty doctrine to be applied broadly). 
 146 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239 (“[L]ocal evils appear to be but one of the types of cases in which a 
departure from the equal sovereignty principle is permitted.”). 
 147 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (emphasizing that the equal sovereignty doctrine is fun-
damental, and holding that an act’s disparate geographic treatment must be sufficiently related to its 
targeted problem); see also Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
intended the equal sovereignty doctrine to be broadly applied). 
 148 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (observing that a statute’s disparate treatment is justified 
when sufficiently related to the problem that the legislation targets (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 
203)). 
 149 Id. at 2624 (noting that the VRA’s unequal treatment of states was initially justified by excep-
tional conditions of voter discrimination that “had infected the electoral process in certain parts of our 
country” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the 
expanded equal sovereignty doctrine, as outlined in Shelby County, clearly extends to economic regu-
lations such as PASPA). 
 150 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (describing the exceptional conditions of widespread voter 
discrimination that prompted passage of the VRA). 
 151 Cf. id. at 2630 (emphasizing that the equal sovereignty doctrine “requires an Act’s disparate 
geographical coverage to be sufficiently related to its targeted problems” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)). Although the Shelby County majority 
does not explicitly reference the Commerce Clause, the dissenting justices read the majority’s expansion 
of the equal sovereignty doctrine as potentially affecting statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause if 
they discriminate among states. Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the ex-
panded equal sovereignty doctrine places numerous statutes on shaky constitutional grounds). For 
example, two statutes cited by the dissent as examples of statutes that may not remain constitutional 
were passed under the Commerce Clause. Id.; see Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 160, 101 Stat. 1330-227, 1330-228 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 10172a 
(2006)) (stating that only Nevada will be eligible to enter into a benefits agreement with the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services); Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)). 
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that Congress may take to remedy certain exceptional conditions—not a gen-
eral exception to the equal sovereignty doctrine.152 
Finally, application of the equal sovereignty doctrine to the Commerce 
Clause also furthers the Clause’s intended purpose of ensuring the uniformity of 
economic regulations.153 Although the Supreme Court has held that the Com-
merce Clause does not require geographic uniformity,154 its underlying purpose 
is to authorize Congress to establish uniform commercial regulations.155 When 
drafting the Constitution, the Framers intended for the Commerce Clause to en-
sure that Congress could enact a uniform trade policy among foreign nations and 
among the several states.156 The equal sovereignty doctrine does not impose a 
uniformity requirement on the Commerce Clause, but rather heightens judicial 
scrutiny for statutes that treat states disparately.157 This provides Congress flexi-
                                                                                                                           
 152 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (emphasizing that the VRA was initially upheld because the 
additional restrictions applied only to the targeted states sufficiently related to Congress’s intended 
goal). 
 153 See generally Morgan, 328 U.S. at 385 (noting the need for national uniformity in the regula-
tions for interstate travel as a desirable goal of the Commerce Clause); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
175 U.S. at 227 (concluding that the primary goal behind the Commerce Clause was “to insure uni-
formity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state legislation”); Colby, supra note 131, 
at 314 (arguing that a main purpose for drafting the Constitution was to give Congress the power to 
adopt uniform trade policies); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 1387, 1454 (1987) (arguing that the Commerce Clause was intended to facilitate national 
markets and prevent state balkanization). 
 154 See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939) (concluding that Congress is not required to 
establish uniform rules under the Commerce Clause); Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 
U.S. 311, 326–27 (1917) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not require uniform regulations). 
 155 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 265 (1981) (noting 
that Congress’s interest in national uniform standards is a valid concern for enacting legislation under 
the Commerce Clause); Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: 
“Yes” to Broad Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; “No” to Federal Legislation 
on Social and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1238 (2003) (arguing that the Framers believed 
that uniformity was beneficial for commerce). 
 156 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 297 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (noting that 
the Constitution will allow foreign trade to be regulated by uniform laws); see also Colby, supra note 
131, at 314 (arguing that a main purpose for drafting the Constitution was to give Congress the power 
to adopt uniform trade policies). Some scholars contend that part of the purpose behind federal 
preemption is to ensure uniform economic regulations. See Colby, supra note 131, at 314; Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) (noting that pro-preemption groups tend to be businesses that seek uni-
formity in regulation). 
 157 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624, 2630 (illustrating that the equal sovereignty doctrine did not 
invalidate the VRA when exceptional conditions justified its disparate treatment and noting that the 
doctrine only later invalidated this treatment when the burdens were no longer reasonably related to 
the targeted problem of voter discrimination). See generally Colby, supra note 131, at 339 (arguing 
that congressional acts should be subject to heightened scrutiny if they regulate along state lines and 
should be upheld only if enacted to solve a localized problem that does not exist elsewhere in the 
nation). 
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bility in enacting national regulation, but requires any unequal treatment of states 
to be reasonably related to the national policy.158 
B. Sufficiently Related to the Targeted Problem: Applying Equal 
Sovereignty Doctrine to the Commerce Clause 
The expanded equal sovereignty doctrine places a check on laws passed 
under the Commerce Clause that treat states disparately.159 This restraint requires 
Congress to justify the disparate treatment of states through findings that show 
the legislation targets a localized problem that does not exist in the unaffected 
states.160 Applying the equal sovereignty doctrine to economic regulations that 
treat states unequally harmonizes the language of Shelby County with Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.161 
As the Supreme Court has held in other circumstances, statutes passed un-
der the Commerce Clause are subject to additional scrutiny when federalism 
concerns are at play.162 Traditionally, judicial review of legislation enacted pur-
                                                                                                                           
 158 Compare Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151–55 (1971) (illustrating that Congress has 
wide discretion in legislating under the Commerce Clause), with Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623, 30–
31 (illustrating—by applying the equal sovereignty doctrine to the VRA—that inserting the doctrine 
into Commerce Clause analyses would not impose a uniformity requirement, but would require dis-
parate treatment to be reasonably related to the legislation’s targeted problem). 
 159 See supra notes 129–158 (discussing how the equal sovereignty doctrine should apply to the 
Commerce Clause); cf. Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that courts should revive the Com-
merce Clause’s uniformity restraint in order to prevent disparate treatment of states); Deborah Jones 
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 78 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause should be utilized by the Supreme Court to 
shield state autonomy from federal regulation); Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court intended the equal sovereignty doctrine to be applied broadly). 
 160 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). See generally 
Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that imposing a more stringent standard of review on legisla-
tion that discriminates among the states is faithful to the Founders intent). 
 161 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (concluding that a departure from the equal sover-
eignty doctrine requires a showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem it targets (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)), with Gregory, 501 U.S. at 
460–64 (noting that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to limit the sovereignty 
of the states), Hodel, 452 U.S. at 265 (noting that Congress’s interest in national uniform standards is 
a valid concern for enacting legislation under the Commerce Clause), and Morgan, 328 U.S. at 389 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating “[t]he States cannot impose diversity of treatment when such 
diverse treatment would result in unreasonable burdens on Commerce”). 
 162 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57 (observing that the act at issue upset the balance of federalism 
and that even the broad modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause is subject to constitutional 
limitations); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–64 (noting that the Commerce Clause does not give 
Congress the power to limit the sovereignty of the states). See generally Merritt, supra note 159, at 78 
(arguing that the Guarantee Clause should be utilized by the Supreme Court to shield state autonomy 
from federal regulation). 
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suant to the Commerce Clause is limited to a rational basis standard.163 There-
fore, courts typically uphold economic regulations as long as Congress has 
demonstrated a rational basis.164 From the language of Shelby County, however, 
the equal sovereignty doctrine should also apply when the legislation treats 
states disparately.165 Furthermore, other doctrinal limitations, such as the anti-
commandeering principle, are utilized in a similar fashion to constrain the 
Commerce Clause.166 This demonstrates that more stringent standards may be 
imposed on the Commerce Clause if the economic regulation creates federalism 
concerns.167 Commerce Clause jurisprudence thus supports the notion that the 
equal sovereignty doctrine should apply to the Commerce Clause.168 
As a result, rather than using the rational basis test, courts should review 
federal legislation that produces disparate treatment and was enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause under the more stringent equal sovereignty doctrine.169 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276. Recall that this involves a minimal level of judicial scrutiny and 
that legislation subject to a rational basis review benefits from a presumption of constitutionality. Id.; see 
also United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (concluding that there is a pre-
sumption of constitutionality in rational basis review under the Fifth Amendment). 
 164 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 358–
59 (1964) (noting that courts will uphold congressional actions passed under the Commerce Clause if 
Congress had any rational basis to conclude the activity impacted commerce). The rational basis 
standard has been criticized for insulating Congress from meaningful review. See Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (contending that a more 
searching judicial review of legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause is required in order to 
prevent significant diminution of state sovereignty); Wille, supra note 138, at 1088 (arguing that the 
rational basis standard is too lenient for congressional actions that potentially overreach). 
 165 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (concluding that a departure from the equal sovereignty 
doctrine requires a showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to 
the problem it targets (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)); Winneker et al., supra note 36, at 52 
(arguing that the Supreme Court intended the equal sovereignty doctrine to be applied broadly). 
 166 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel 
state agents to implement a federal regulatory program enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause); 
New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that an economic regulation of nuclear waste enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional because it impermissibly compelled state officials to ad-
minister the regulatory program). The “anti-commandeering principle” prohibits Congress from com-
manding state officials to enact a federal regulation. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 934. 
 167 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; New York, 505 U.S. at 188; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–64 
(noting that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to limit the sovereignty of the 
states); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (opining that “[i]t would be a mistake to 
conclude that Congress’s power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited”). 
 168 See supra notes 162–167 and accompanying text; see also Wille, supra note 138, at 1090–91, 
1094 (arguing that the Supreme Court applies a more stringent standard of review when reviewing 
congressional actions that encroach on state sovereignty). 
 169 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (holding that the equal sovereignty doctrine requires a 
showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it targets 
(quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)); supra notes 162–168 and accompanying text (illustrating that 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence supports the imposition of increased restrictions in cases that raise 
federalism concerns); cf. Colby, supra note 131, at 339 (arguing that congressional acts enacted pur-
suant to the commerce power should be subjected to some form of heightened scrutiny if they regulate 
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This approach requires courts to inquire as to whether an act’s disparate geo-
graphic coverage is sufficiently related to its targeted problems.170 Applying the 
equal sovereignty doctrine to federal economic regulations would force Con-
gress to justify current burdens with a record demonstrating the current targeted 
needs.171 
Statutes that require equal sovereignty analysis can be identified by deter-
mining whether the statute prohibits state actions in one state that remain per-
missible in another.172 For such legislation to survive equal sovereignty analysis, 
Congress must prove that the problem exists in the states targeted and does not 
exist or is substantially less burdensome in the areas exempted.173 To determine 
whether the legislation is justified, the court should review the congressional 
findings and determine whether the unequal treatment of states reasonably ad-
dresses the targeted issue.174 Federal legislation that shows a continuing need for 
targeted regulation would survive review under the equal sovereignty doc-
trine.175 By contrast, a law that facially discriminates among states will not sur-
                                                                                                                           
in geographic terms, and, in particular, should be viewed with significant skepticism if their regulatory 
scope is explicitly drawn along state lines); Paul, supra note 140, at 293 (explaining that Northwest 
Austin emphasized that the VRA should be reviewed under a stricter standard of review, rather than a 
rational basis test). 
 170 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 171 Cf. id. (concluding that Congress failed to justify the VRA’s burdens by showing that the act 
remedies current conditions). 
 172 See id. at 2627 (emphasizing that the VRA’s preclearance requirements create burdens on 
some states that would be unconstitutional if applied to uncovered states, underscoring the VRA’s 
violation of the equal sovereignty doctrine). See generally Nelson Lund, Congressional Power over 
Taxation and Commerce: The Supreme Court’s Lost Chance to Devise a Consistent Doctrine, 18 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 729, 754 (1987) (arguing that legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause that seeks a 
purpose other than facilitating free trade poses a great threat to federalism). 
 173 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining the majority’s 
expansion of the equal sovereignty doctrine); Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that Congress 
must justify disparate treatment of states). 
 174 See Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that the courts should scrutinize laws targeting 
particular state and determine whether Congress was responding to a problem unique to that region); 
cf. Jeffrey Kessler, Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat to Federalism?, 76 COL-
UM. L. REV. 990, 1026–28 (1976) (arguing that when addressing federal statutes that impede on state 
sovereignty, courts should balance state and federal interests and determine whether the statute appro-
priately addresses an issue of national concern). 
 175 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (indicating that disparate treatment that is sufficiently 
related to the problem it targets will survive the equal sovereignty doctrine (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 
U.S. at 203)); cf. Colby, supra note 131, at 346 (arguing that the courts should scrutinize laws target-
ing particular geographic regions closely to make sure Congress was responding to a problem unique 
to the regulated region). For example, the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(NWPA) differentiates among states. See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-203, § 160, 101 Stat. 1330-227, 1330-228 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 10172a (2006)) 
(stating that only Nevada will be eligible to enter into a benefits agreement with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services); Cnty. of Esmeralda v. Dep’t of Energy, 925 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 
1991) (noting that the NWPA provides funds exclusively available for the counties surrounding Yucca 
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vive equal sovereignty analysis if Congress cannot justify why the legislation 
regulates certain states and not others.176 It does not matter whether the legisla-
tion’s disparate treatment of states is preferential or disadvantageous to a limited 
number of states.177 The purpose of the equal sovereignty doctrine is to uphold 
the notion that the United States is, and will remain, a union of states equal in 
sovereignty.178 
Furthermore, such an approach implements the equal sovereignty doctrine 
without disturbing Commerce Clause jurisprudence.179 Application of the equal 
sovereignty doctrine to the Commerce Clause does not impose a requirement of 
uniformity because disparate treatment of states can still be justified.180 Instead, 
                                                                                                                           
Mountain). But the NWPA would likely survive equal sovereignty doctrine analysis because the dis-
parate treatment is sufficiently related to the remedying of a local evil. See Cnty. of Esmeralda, 925 
F.2d at 1220 (noting that the NWPA provides funds exclusively available for the counties surrounding 
Yucca Mountain to remedy environmental and socioeconomic impacts created by the Yucca Mountain 
nuclear waste storage facility). 
 176 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630. For example, the 1998 Internet Tax Freedom Act is a law 
that likely would be struck down under equal sovereignty analysis. See Colby, supra note 131, at 342 
(arguing that the Internet Tax Freedom Act should be held unconstitutional because it impermissibly 
discriminates among states); Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional Limitations on 
Congressional Preemptions of State Tax, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 41, 93–94 (2012) (arguing that the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act is unconstitutional because the grandfather clause prevents a uniform inter-
net sales tax and is particularly intrusive with respect to the states’ sovereignty). See generally Internet 
Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, secs. 2–6, §§ 1101(a), 1104–1106, 
121 Stat. 1024, 1024–26 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (Supp. V 2011) (Internet Tax 
Freedom Act)) (providing that the moratorium on state internet taxes does not apply to state taxes 
already in effect). The Internet Tax Freedom Act exempts nine states from the federal prohibition of 
Internet taxes. See Colby, supra note 133, at 342; secs. 2–6, §§ 1101(a), 1104–1106, 121 Stat. at 
1024–26. 
 177 See Colby, supra note 131, at 255, 322, 345–46 (arguing that statutes that grant preferential 
treatment to a limited number of states at the expense of others are unconstitutional). 
 178 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (“‘This Union’ was and is a union of States, equal in 
power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution itself.”). 
 179 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (concluding that a departure from the equal sover-
eignty doctrine requires a showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem it targets (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203)), with Gregory, 501 U.S. at 
460–64 (noting that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to limit the sovereignty 
of the states), Hodel, 452 U.S. at 265 (noting that Congress’s interest in national uniform standards is 
a valid concern for enacting legislation under the Commerce Clause), Morgan, 328 U.S. at 389 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he States cannot impose diversity of treatment when such 
diverse treatment would result in unreasonable burdens on Commerce.”), and Wille, supra note 138, 
at 1090–91 (arguing that the Supreme Court applies a more stringent standard of review to legislation 
enacted under the Commerce Clause when reviewing congressional actions that encroach on state 
sovereignty). 
 180 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624, 2630 (illustrating that the equal sovereignty doctrine did not 
invalidate the VRA when exceptional conditions justified its disparate treatment and noting that the 
doctrine only later invalidated this treatment when the burdens were no longer reasonably related to 
the targeted problem of voter discrimination); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (holding that departure 
from the equal sovereignty doctrine could be justified by exceptional conditions). 
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the equal sovereignty doctrine will prevent Congress from enacting economic 
regulations that empower certain states in a specified industry at the expense of 
others.181 
C. PASPA Fails to Remedy the Current Conditions of Sports Betting 
Under the proposed standard of review, PASPA violates the equal sover-
eignty doctrine because the burdens PASPA imposes do not sufficiently relate to 
the problems Congress intended to address.182 Because PASPA facially discrimi-
nates against states, a court must review its underlying logic to determine wheth-
er it adequately addresses sports gambling.183 A court must further take into ac-
count the legislation’s current impact on states and whether congressional find-
ings justify the current burdens.184 
Congressional findings supporting PASPA fail to justify the current burdens 
it imposes.185 In enacting PASPA, Congress sought to stop the spread of sports 
gambling, which the Senate Report characterized as a national problem because 
its harm could not be contained within state borders.186 These findings fail to 
justify PASPA’s disparate coverage, as exempting four states undermines Con-
gress’s stated purpose and demonstrates its naked attempt to limit the legisla-
tion’s effects on particular states.187 The rational approach by Congress would be 
to outlaw sports gambling completely, but instead, Congress allowed sports 
gambling to continue in four states.188 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (concluding that Congress failed to justify the VRA’s 
burdens by showing that the act remedies current conditions); Colby, supra note 131, at 342 (arguing 
that PASPA is constitutionally suspect because the problem it addresses is not isolated to the areas 
covered). 
 182 See Colby, supra note 131, at 342 (arguing that PASPA’s purpose does not sufficiently sup-
port its discriminate treatment of states); cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 183 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630–31 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (concluding that 
a departure from the equal sovereignty doctrine requires a showing that the statute’s disparate geo-
graphic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it targets)). 
 184 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that courts must 
review the Congressional findings associated with a statute in relation to the current burdens it imposes). 
 185 See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991) (noting that although gambling is a national concern that 
cannot be limited geographically, Nevada will be exempt from PASPA’s prohibition); see also Colby, 
supra note 131, at 342 (arguing that PASPA’s congressional findings fail to justify regulating along 
state lines because gambling is a national problem, yet Nevada’s gambling industry is allowed to 
flourish). 
 186 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4. 
 187 See Colby, supra note 131, at 342 (arguing that PASPA’s congressional findings demonstrate 
that Nevada’s exemption undermines the regulatory scheme); cf. Raich, 545 U.S. at 30 (noting that 
allowing variations in state laws within a national federal regulatory scheme is a dubious proposition). 
See generally Lund, supra note 172, at 754 (arguing that legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause 
that seeks a purpose other than facilitating free trade poses a great threat to federalism). 
 188 Compare S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (noting that gambling is a national concern that cannot be 
limited geographically), with 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012) (exempting states that allowed or operated a 
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It comes as little surprise then that in the twenty-two years since its enact-
ment, with Internet access increasing Americans’ access to Nevada’s sports 
gambling monopoly, PASPA fails to reasonably address the spread of sports 
gambling.189 For example, PASPA’s exemption encouraged Delaware to re-
introduce and expand its preexisting sports lottery.190 Furthermore, the prolifera-
tion of Internet access and the increased popularity of fantasy sports prompted 
the DOJ to state its intention to allow states to regulate Internet gambling within 
their own state.191 With ten states, including New Jersey, set to legalize Internet 
gambling, PASPA has become obsolete.192 With the rise in sports gambling’s 
popularity and the proliferation of Internet access, Americans nationwide have 
access to Nevada sports books, which has drastically increased the number of 
Nevada sports books and the sums being wagered.193 PASPA has thus failed to 
                                                                                                                           
sports betting scheme between 1976 and 1990 from PASPA), Waddell & Minke, supra note 8, at 35–
36 (observing that PASPA grandfathered Oregon and Delaware’s sports lotteries and Montana’s 
sports gambling pool), and Galasso, supra note 4, at 167 (explaining that PASPA’s overall effect 
granted Nevada a monopoly on sports gambling). 
 189 See Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protec-
tion Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 588 (2013) (noting that technological advanc-
es and the e-commerce industry has contributed to the significant increase in sports gambling); see 
also NCAA, 730 F.3d at 225 (noting that since PASPA was enacted, sports gambling has grown to a 
five hundred billion dollar per year industry). One 1999 report by the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission concluded that many Americans do not even know sports gambling is illegal. See 
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 10, at 2-14. See generally Craig, supra note 
13, at 67 (arguing that PASPA is one of the most frequently broken laws in the United States Code). 
One often cited reason for this issue is the publication of Las Vegas points spreads in states where 
sports gambling is illegal. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 10, at 2-14. 
 190 See Shur, supra note 6, at 109 (arguing that Delaware reauthorized sports gambling because of 
its preferential status under PASPA). The NCAA, MLB, NFL, and NBA challenged Delaware’s sports 
wagering scheme, but the reintroduction of the sports lottery was upheld. See MLB v. Markell, 579 
F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that PASPA’s grandfather clause allows Delaware to implement 
a sports gambling scheme, but only to the extent that the scheme was conducted at the time). Dela-
ware, however, did not challenge PASPA’s constitutionality. See id. It has been argued that Delaware 
purposefully avoided constitutional issues because it enjoyed its preferential status. See Goldstein, 
supra note 50, at 366 (noting that Delaware had an interest in not challenging PASPA because it stood 
to benefit from the closed market scheme). 
 191 See Rose & Bolin, supra note 12, at 693–94 (arguing that a recent DOJ memorandum indi-
cates that states will be given more freedom to regulate their own Internet gambling); cf. Whether 
Proposals by Ill. & N.Y. to Use the Internet and out-of-State Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery 
Tickets to in-State Adults Violate the Wire Act, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 13 (2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WG85-LZCY 
(expressing the opinion that Illinois and New York proposals to use the Internet and out-of-state trans-
action processors to sell lottery tickets to in-state adults does not violate the Wire Act). 
 192 See Kate Zernike, New Jersey Now Allows Gambling via the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2013, at A19; At Least 10 States Considering Internet Gambling Bills, CBSNEWS (Feb. 5, 2014, 1:53 
PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/at-least-10-states-considering-internet-gambling-bills, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Z8M6-6KEV. 
 193 See Brent J. Goodfellow, Betting on the Future of Sports: Why Gambling Should Be Left off 
the Field of Play, 2 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 21, 39 (2005) (noting that the popularity of Internet 
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curb state-sponsored sports gambling or protect the nation’s youth from gam-
bling, and has instead positioned Nevada to hold a monopoly on an enormously 
profitable industry.194 
The current burdens PASPA imposes, therefore, do not meet the current 
needs it targets.195 Indeed, PASPA applies equally to forty-six states, but the ex-
emption allows sports gambling to flourish in Nevada, prohibiting this potential 
source of revenue in other states.196 This is particularly true in states with a histo-
ry of legalized gambling, such as New Jersey.197 PASPA places these states’ 
gaming industries at a disadvantage against Nevada because PASPA prohibits 
the former’s casinos from offering competing services.198 
                                                                                                                           
sports betting has increased the success of Nevada’s sports betting scheme); see also Shur, supra note 
6, at 113 (explaining that the number of Las Vegas sports books has increased to handle an increased 
number of sports bets). 
 194 Compare supra notes 189–193 and accompanying text (observing the spread of sports gam-
bling subsequent to PASPA’s passage), with Galasso, supra note 4, at 182 (arguing that PASPA effec-
tively granted Nevada a monopoly on sports gambling). 
 195 Compare S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991) (noting that gambling is a national concern that 
cannot be limited geographically), with 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012) (exempting states that allowed or 
operated a sports betting scheme between 1976 and 1990 from PASPA), Waddell & Minke, supra 
note 8, at 35–36 (observing that PASPA grandfathered Oregon and Delaware’s sports lotteries and 
Montana’s sports gambling pool), Colby, supra note 131, at 341–43 (arguing that Congress is not 
justified in exempting Nevada from PASPA because sports gambling “is surely a bigger problem in 
Nevada,” where the sports gambling industry continues to grow, “than it is in Utah”), Galasso, supra 
note 4, at 167 (explaining that PASPA’s overall effect granted Nevada a monopoly on sports gam-
bling), and supra notes 189–193 and accompanying text (observing the spread of sports gambling 
subsequent to PASPA’s passage). 
 196 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (exempting states that allowed or operated a sports betting scheme 
between 1976 and 1990 from PASPA), with Waddell & Minke, supra note 8, at 35–36 (observing that 
PASPA grandfathered Oregon and Delaware’s sports lotteries and Montana’s sports gambling pool), 
and Galasso, supra note 4, at 167 (explaining that PASPA’s overall effect granted Nevada a monopo-
ly on sports gambling). See generally Michael Levinson, Note, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would 
Benefit from Legalized Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 178 (2006) (arguing that by legaliz-
ing sport wagering, New Jersey can harness a valuable source of revenue for the state and allow the 
casinos in Atlantic City to remain competitive within the industry); Galasso, supra note 4, at 180 
(noting that sports gambling generates billions of dollars in government revenue for Nevada). 
 197 Cf. Levinson, supra note 196, at 151 (noting that Atlantic City casinos would benefit signifi-
cantly from the legalization of sports wagering). Moreover, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 
Indian tribes may conduct gaming activities by entering into a compact between the tribe and the state 
where the activities are located. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c) (2012). Even within grandfathered 
states, however, Indian tribes may not operate sports books. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 44–45 (1996) (outlining the permissible Indian gaming activities); A. Gregory Gibbs, Anchorage: 
Gaming Capital of the Pacific Rim, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 343, 367 (2000) (noting that sports betting is 
not available at the various Indian casinos nationwide). 
 198 See Levinson, supra note 196, at 178. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that the equal sovereignty doctrine requires a federal legislation’s disparate im-
pact among states to have a sufficient relationship to its targeted problems. In 
emphasizing the importance of this heightened standard, the Court breathed new 
life into this long dormant body of law. Following Shelby County, it is unclear 
how the equal sovereignty doctrine applies to economic regulations that discrim-
inate among states, such as the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(“PASPA”). 
This Note argues that the equal sovereignty doctrine applies to all regula-
tions that treat states differently. Under this test, an economic regulation will be 
upheld only if its disparate burdens are sufficiently related to the problem that it 
seeks to address. This approach best effectuates the Supreme Court’s recent re-
vival of the equal sovereignty doctrine and reinforces uniformity as a constraint 
on the Commerce Clause power. Under this test, PASPA fails to meet the equal 
sovereignty standard because allowing a select number of states to retain sports 
gambling schemes is not sufficiently related to Congress’s purported goal of 
curbing the spread of sports gambling. The demise of PASPA as unconstitution-
al, therefore, is a safe bet. 
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